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Institutions, Demography,  
and Economic Growth
TRACY K. DENNISON AND SHEILAGH OGILVIE
This article evaluates criticisms by Sarah G. Carmichael, Alexandra de Pleijt, 
Jan Luiten van Zanden, and Tine De Moor of our view of the European Marriage 
Pattern (EMP), and explains why their claims are incorrect. We elaborate our 
arguments concerning the institutional sources of economic growth, explore 
the relationship between women’s position and the EMP, analyze the two-way 
links between demographic and economic behavior, and explicate aspects of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
economic growth, we reiterate, are not to be found in the EMP but rather must be 
sought in the wider framework of nonfamilial institutions.
In a recently published article we examined the relationship between demography, institutions, and economic growth in early modern 
Europe (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014), focussing on recent claims that 
the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) was the institution that caused 
European economic growth. Analyzing 4,705 observations of demo-
graphic behavior for 39 countries, we found no evidence of the claimed 
relationship, nor any empirical support for the idea that the EMP improved 
female autonomy, increased human capital investment, enhanced demo-
graphic responsiveness to economic conditions, or created growth-
inducing cultural norms. The institutional sources of economic growth, 
we concluded, resided in nonfamilial institutions, which differed across 
societies, not in the EMP, which was shared by fast- and slow-growing 
economies alike.
Carmichael, de Pleijt, van Zanden, and De Moor (CPZM), although 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
article refutes their criticisms, and elaborates our arguments concerning 
the relationship between institutions, demography and growth. 
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INSTITUTIONS
???????? ???????????? ????? ????????????? ???????????????????????????
(Ogilvie 2001, 2003, 2011; Dennison and Ogilvie 2007; Dennison 2011a, 
2011b, 2013). However, the key institution favoring economic growth 
in Europe cannot have been the family system (Dennison and Ogilvie 
2014, pp. 673–80, 684–87). Observing an institution in a successful 
economy does not necessarily imply a causal relationship: the institu-
tion may be present because of the economy’s success, or the successful 
economy may perform well for other underlying reasons, despite, rather 
????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????????????
contribute to success in successful economies, and which do not, requires 
careful empirical investigation. 
In order to provide institutional explanations for economic growth, we 
need to identify institutional differences between slow- and fast-growing 
economies. The EMP, we argue, was not one of these differences. The 
EMP was associated with rapid growth in some early modern economies, 
such as England and the Netherlands, but with slow growth in others, 
including Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, and Bohemia (Dennison and 
Ogilvie 2014, pp. 659–72). The economic success of England and the 
Netherlands cannot be explained in terms of a phenomenon that they 
shared with many other economies that grew much more slowly.
CPZM criticize us for failing to acknowledge that the characteristics of 
the EMP were “outcome variables that change with the changing nature 
of economic circumstances.” In fact, we point out the endogeneity of 
demographic decisions repeatedly in our article (Dennison and Ogilvie 
2014, pp. 672–73, 677). That institutions, such as marriage systems, 
are embedded in larger institutional frameworks is something we have 
long emphasized (Dennison 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Ogilvie 2007; Ogilvie 
and Carus 2014). However, the institutional frameworks in which the 
EMP was embedded were not ones that invariably facilitated economic 
growth (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 673–77, 684–87). Available 
scholarship suggests, and CPZM themselves acknowledge, that the 
demographic practices highlighted in the EMP required a framework of 
strong nonfamilial institutions that could substitute for the labor, insur-
ance, and welfare services that families could not provide when marriage 
was non-universal and households small. But such nonfamilial institu-
tions were not always ones that favored economic growth. In some cases, 
they included “generalized” institutions, such as relatively impartial 
states and reasonably well-functioning factor and product markets, which 
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were open to participation by broad social strata.1 EMP countries such as 
England and the Netherlands (the focus of the “girlpower” thesis) experi-
enced successful economic growth to the extent that they developed and 
maintained such generalized institutions. In other cases, the wider insti-
tutional framework surrounding the EMP consisted of “particularized” 
institutions such as closed corporate communities, occupational guilds, 
manorial systems, religious bodies, and absolutist states, which allocated 
?????????? ????????????? ???? ?????????????? ??????? ????? ????? ?????????
participation. EMP countries such as Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Bohemia, and Sweden, where particularized institutions were entrenched, 
suffered from low per capita incomes and slow economic growth. We do 
not dispute that institutions affect economic performance, but point out 
theoretical and empirical reasons for focussing on the wider framework 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on European growth. 
WOMEN’S POSITION
??????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ???????????? ???? ???????????
of female autonomy for economic growth. They maintain that the EMP 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
growth (Ogilvie and Edwards 2000; Ogilvie 2003; Dennison 2011a; 
Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, p. 676), we found no evidence that the 
???????? ??????? ?????????? ??? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ?????????
(Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–76). Quantitative indicators of 
women’s agency such as female household headship, female labor force 
participation, and female wage rates were not uniformly high in EMP 
societies or uniformly low in non-EMP societies. More qualitative indi-
cators of women’s position, including property rights, inheritance, and 
credit market participation, point in the same direction. Devising rigorous 
qualitative indicators of female autonomy that are comparable across 
societies is a challenge for future research. 
Women had a good economic position in some societies with the 
EMP, notably England and the Netherlands, but these countries were 
also distinctive in their per capita incomes, relative factor prices, 
resource endowments, geopolitical position, commercial participation, 
1 On the distinction between generalized and particularized institutions see Ogilvie 2011, pp. 
193–94, 428ff, and Ogilvie and Carus 2014, pp. 428–36.
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parliamentary governments, legal systems, credit markets, and early 
liberalization of corporative, communal, and seigneurial institutions—all 
variables which have been ascribed a causal role in enhancing female 
autonomy and economic growth. Moreover, women had a much worse 
position in a number of societies in nordic, central, and eastern-central 
Europe where the EMP prevailed to an equal or greater degree (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 673–74). To explain English and Dutch distinc-
tiveness in female autonomy and economic performance, one cannot 
invoke the EMP, which England and the Netherlands shared with many 
other societies in which women were more thoroughly excluded from 
economic participation and economic growth was slow. 
The research studies we referred to in our article indicate that both 
???????? ????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ????? ????????? ?????????? ???
other institutions, regardless of marriage or family pattern (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 674–76). This is consistent with our more general 
emphasis on the importance of the wider institutional framework for both 
female agency and economic growth. Craft guilds excluded women from 
vocational training and employment in Italy and Spain (in the absence of 
the EMP) and in Germany and Sweden (in its presence). Village commu-
nities restricted women’s market participation in Russia (outside the 
EMP) and in Germany and Bohemia (where the EMP prevailed). The 
presence of the EMP did not prevent female household headship from 
being restricted by manorial institutions in Bohemia, and the absence 
of the EMP did not deter manorial institutions from permitting high 
female headship in Russia, where it suited landlords’ interests. It was 
not the EMP but rather nonfamilial institutions—guilds, communities, 
???????????????????????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????????????
could obtain vocational training, head independent households, supply 
and employ labor, offer and obtain credit, buy, sell and rent land, and 
transact in product markets. These institutions, not the family system, 
determined whether women made a full contribution to the economy, 
???????? ???????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ???-
ciently, and whether the economy grew successfully.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOGRAPHY AND THE ECONOMY
CPZM argue that the EMP should not be measured in terms of “levels” 
of demographic statistics, such as marriage age. Instead, they contend, it 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
terms of cultural norms, female agency, and demographic responsive-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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argue, can explain why fast-growing England and the Netherlands did 
not, in fact, manifest the most “pure” or “extreme” variant of the EMP 
as had originally been contended (De Moor and van Zanden 2010, p. 4; 
Voigtländer and Voth 2006, pp. 323, 348). CPZM argue that England 
and the Netherlands failed to manifest the EMP in extreme form because 
English and Dutch people responded to successful economic growth by 
reducing their marriage age. 
??? ??? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??? ???
investigated and to identify measurable indicators of that phenomenon. 
Fortunately, historical demographers have done precisely this for the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
indicators associated with it. We do not focus solely on marriage age, as 
CPZM claim in their abstract, but analyze three separate demographic 
???????????? ??????? ???? ??? ????? ?????????? ??????? ????????? ?????????? ????
nuclear-family household structure (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
tion of the EMP (see Hajnal 1982) and were previously accepted by the 
authors of the CPZM note (e.g., De Moor and van Zanden 2010, pp. 2, 
7, 9, 17–19, 23). In addition, we analyze the mechanisms through which 
the EMP is argued to have caused economic growth, including the female 
agency, cultural norms, and demographic responsiveness invoked in 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
As just noted, there is no empirical support for the view that the 
EMP endowed women with a uniquely favorable economic position. 
Neither quantitative nor qualitative indicators of female agency were 
uniformly high in EMP societies or uniformly low in non-EMP societies 
(Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–76). Longitudinal evidence on 
English women’s wages also casts doubt on a “girl-powered” economic 
breakthrough (Humphries and Weisdorf 2015). No rigorous measure of 
women’s economic position supports the view that being characterized 
by the EMP enabled societies to achieve a distinctive degree of female 
agency. 
We also examined the claim that societies with the EMP exhibited 
distinctive, growth-inducing norms and values (Dennison and Ogilvie 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???? ??? ????????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ????????????? ??? ????????
culture or Weberian Protestantism. Nor is there evidence for the proposi-
tion advanced by CPZM that medieval Christian dogma created cultural 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
fact, studies of the practical implementation of medieval ecclesiastical 
provisions concerning demographic behavior strongly emphasize the role 
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played by underlying nonfamilial social institutions including property 
rights and legal systems. Associating the EMP with medieval Christian 
dogma is also problematic given that marriage and other familial practices 
varied enormously across Christian Europe and that the EMP was not the 
prevalent familial institution in those societies, such as Italy and Iberia, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2014, pp. 684–85). The distribution of European marriage patterns that 
emerges from empirical research is not consistent with any notion that 
distinctive cultural norms determined either demographic behavior or 
economic growth.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the degree to which demographic behavior responds to economic circum-
stances. CPZM reiterate a claim advanced in some recent literature 
(and addressed in our article) that economies such as those of England 
and the Netherlands grew faster because the EMP made their demo-
graphic behavior particularly responsive to economic conditions (e.g., 
Voigtländer and Voth 2006; De Moor and van Zanden 2010). The elas-
ticity of marriage and fertility with respect to economic signals does lend 
itself to empirical measurement and has generated a substantial literature 
(surveyed in Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 680–83). Our exploration 
of this literature found that demographic responsiveness to economic 
conditions did not depend on the EMP, since it was observed historically 
in societies as diverse as northern Italy and China, in which the EMP did 
not prevail. Nor was demographic responsiveness to economic condi-
tions only found in successfully growing economies. In fact, it turns out 
to have been less pronounced in England than in a number of slower-
growing European economies (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 680–83). 
The gap in economic performance between England and other European 
(and non-European) societies cannot, therefore, be attributed to the EMP 
or to the way it may have mediated demographic responses to economic 
circumstances.
Abandoning the original claim that the EMP prevailed in its most 
“pure” form in England and the Netherlands, powering those countries’ 
successful economic growth (De Moor and van Zanden 2010, p. 4), CPZM 
speculate that England and the Netherlands manifested a moderate form 
of the EMP precisely because their successful economic growth encour-
aged people to marry earlier. However, this reformulation of the EMP 
theory of European economic growth must also be treated with caution. 
For the EMP to have “played a fundamental role in western Europe’s 
economic development” (De Moor and van Zanden 2010, p. 1), fast-
growing England and the Netherlands would have to have had a 
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particularly extreme version of the EMP at some period. This period 
must lie some time before the early to mid-sixteenth century when our 
empirical analysis starts, by which point the data already reveal England 
and the Netherlands to have had a moderate form of the EMP. Very little 
is known about European marriage patterns before c. 1530 due to the lack 
of parish registers and village censuses which are required to calculate 
reliable statistics on marriage age, lifetime celibacy, and household struc-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Netherlands and England were demographically distinctive. Scattered 
and heavily debated observations have suggested a female marriage age 
of c. 20 for various localities in late medieval Europe, including Holland, 
England, Germany, southern France, and northern Italy (Smith 1979, pp. 
77, 81; Dubois 1997, pp. 211, 214; Emigh 1997, pp. 625–26; Kowaleski 
1999, pp. 326–28; Viazzo 2003, p. 133; Dalla-Zuanna et al. 2012, pp. 294, 
296). Ascribing a marriage age of c. 20 in England and the Netherlands to 
rapid economic growth caused by the norms of the EMP, while ascribing 
the same marriage age in southern France or northern Italy to non-EMP 
norms of non-consensual marriage and female disempowerment, risks 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
A second problem is that the scattered data from the pre-parish-register 
era include statistics suggesting demographic behavior consistent with 
the EMP in medieval societies outside England and the Netherlands that 
were not characterized by notable economic growth. One study suggests 
a high lifetime celibacy rate in medieval northern France (Hallam 1985, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
holds in medieval Germany (Hammer 1983, p. 244). To the extent that 
any demographic statistics before 1500 can be relied upon, these would 
suggest that the EMP already prevailed in parts of Europe in the absence 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
demographic statistics for Europe before 1500 come from northern Italy, 
which had the most successful and fastest-growing economy in medieval 
Europe, but also had a non-EMP demographic system characterized by 
early female marriage, low lifetime celibacy, and complex households 
(Smith 1979, p. 77; Kowaleski 1999, pp. 326–28; Dalla-Zuanna et al. 
2012, pp. 294, 296). 
In assessing the plausibility of the idea that an economic-growth-
induced moderation in English and Dutch marriage ages occurred just 
at the point at which each country emerged into empirical observability, 
one must also bear in mind that economic growth can exert counter-
vailing income and substitution effects on marriage behavior (Dennison 
and Ogilvie 2013, p. 20). A rise in wages increases incomes, encouraging 
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people to consume more of all goods, including marriage, thereby 
reducing marriage age and celibacy. But a wage rise will also increase the 
opportunity cost of withdrawing from the labor force, reducing women’s 
incentives to marry, thereby increasing marriage age and celibacy. The 
whole EMP theory of economic growth is based on the idea that a rise 
in women’s wages after the Black Death gave rise to later and non-
universal marriage: it thus relies on the assumption that the substitution 
effect dominated the income effect. But CPZM’s attempt to use rising 
wages to explain away the moderateness of English and Dutch marriage 
behavior relies on the opposite assumption, that the income effect domi-
nated the substitution effect. Theoretically, the relative size of the income 
and substitution effects could have changed between the Black Death 
and the sixteenth century, but there is no evidence that any such change 
occurred. Seeking to explain away moderate English and Dutch marriage 
behavior by adducing a change in the relative magnitudes of the income 
and substitution effects for which there is no actual evidence again risks 
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
if the substitution effect was the dominant one, economic growth would 
have encouraged people to marry later, not earlier, thus making CPZM’s 
claim that the moderate form of the EMP observed in England and the 
Netherlands is the consequence of the effect of rising wages on marriage 
behavior impossible to sustain.
In so far as pre-parish-register data allow us to reach any conclusions, 
they indicate that economic growth occurred in EMP and non-EMP soci-
eties alike and that manifestations of the EMP prevailed in fast- and slow-
growing economies alike. There is no evidence that the net effect of rising 
wages on marriage behavior switched from a dominant substitution effect 
to a dominant income effect just before Dutch and English demographic 
behavior becomes observable in the early sixteenth century. Furthermore, 
even once the Dutch and English economies started to grow, there is no 
evidence that this growth was caused by the EMP rather than by the many 
other features of these societies that have been emphasized by economic 
historians. These considerations make it highly unlikely that the moderate 
demographic behavior observed in England and the Netherlands as soon 
as reliable data become available can be ascribed to their having enjoyed a 
spurt of EMP-caused economic growth at an unobservable earlier period.
The theory that the EMP played a fundamental causal role in European 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
all the variables (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 672–73, 677, 680). 
As soon as one acknowledges that demographic behavior interacts with 
economic conditions, one has to recognize the possibility that causality 
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may run not just from the EMP to economic growth but also from economic 
conditions to demographic behavior, and that both economic growth and 
???????????? ????????? ???? ??? ?????????? ??? ????? ???? ??? ???????????
factors. The endogeneity of demographic and economic behavior is an 
important point, and its recognition by CPZM is a welcome development, 
but it only reinforces our argument that the EMP was not the cause of 
European economic growth.
DATA ON EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC BEHAVIOR
CPZM express puzzlement about certain aspects of our empirical anal-
????????????????? ???????? ??? ???????????????????? ???? ???????????????????
the Mosaic, NAPP, IPUMS, and EHPS websites. Our article made clear, 
however, that we were analyzing statistics calculated by historical demog-
raphers (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–58 and Online Appendix). 
We deliberately refrained from analyzing raw data. Generating statistics 
on marriage age, lifetime celibacy, and household structure from raw data 
in censuses, parish registers, and other primary sources requires months, 
often years, of rigorous analysis by researchers familiar with the sources, 
historical period, and underlying society. To calculate marriage age 
and lifetime celibacy for even one community typically requires under-
taking the exceptionally labor-intensive project of a family reconstitution 
(Henry and Fleury 1956; Wrigley 1966). To obtain just one statistic on 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
celibacy for one community at one date requires analyzing an entire 
census-type listing (Laslett and Wall 1972). To aggregate raw data from 
such disparate and non-homogeneous sources would have defeated our 
purpose, which was to aggregate ?ndings.
????????????? ???? ????? ???????? ????????????? ????? ???????????? ???-
ings derived from studies in which the sources and methods had been 
subjected to some degree of peer review.2 Restricting our data compi-
lation to secondary studies made it possible to maintain data quality 
without seriously diminishing data quantity. We were able to assemble 
4,705 demographic observations, an order of magnitude larger than 
any previous compilation (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–58 and 
Online Appendix).
CPZM also note differences between our 2013 working paper and our 
2014 article, and express concern that our data set contains relatively few 
2 Even then, we were careful to control for potential distortion arising from possible differences 
in peer reviewing among different types of scholarly dissemination (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, 
pp. 657–58).
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observations for some countries. The basic difference between the two 
papers is that the published article included nearly 2,000 more observa-
tions than the working paper. The size of the data set under analysis is 
clearly described in both papers (Dennison and Ogilvie 2013, pp. 4–16 
with Tables 1–3; Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 653–58 with Table 1). 
Our 2013 working paper was based on 175 research studies, from which 
we compiled a total of 2,731 observations of demographic behavior in 32 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
on female lifetime celibacy, and 531 on household structure. Our 2014 
article substantially expanded this database by extracting data from 365 
research studies in total, yielding 4,705 observations on demographic 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ???? ?????????
1,172 on female lifetime celibacy, and 911 on household structure. 
Both data sets revealed the same empirical patterns: the most “pure” or 
“extreme” manifestations of the EMP are not to be found in fast-growing 
economies such as England and the Netherlands (as claimed in De Moor 
and van Zanden 2010, p. 4; Voigtländer and Voth 2006, pp. 323, 348). 
Rather, they are observed in poorer and slower-growing economies in 
nordic, central, and eastern-central Europe (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, 
pp. 659–72). In a Borda ranking of 30 European countries according to 
extremeness of the EMP, England lay about one-quarter of the way down 
???? ???????? ???? ???????????????? ?????????? ??? ????????? ?????????????
economies such as Austria, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, 
???????? ???? ???????? ??????? ????????? ??????? ????????????? ?????
extreme manifestations of the EMP than fast-growing England and the 
Netherlands.
There are, of course, some countries in our data set for which there are 
comparatively few observations, largely because of the lack of demo-
graphic research on those societies. However, the whole point of carrying 
out an econometric analysis and undertaking statistical hypothesis-testing 
is to assess the probability that a difference between two countries is not 
simply the result of sampling variation. If the number of observations 
were so small as to make it probable that apparent differences between 
countries merely resulted from sampling variation, then the hypothesis 
tests reported in our article would have shown that. Our analysis demon-
strates that this is not the case. Thus we show that female marriage age in 
(fast-growing) England was lower than that of 11 (slower-growing) coun-
tries, and we test the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
England and each of these countries. The value of the statistic used for this 
hypothesis test takes account of (inter alia) the number of observations 
available for the relevant countries. The null hypothesis of no difference 
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between England and each of these countries is rejected, the probability 
that the null hypothesis is true being less than 5 percent. The Netherlands 
had female marriage age lower than much poorer and slower-growing 
Denmark and Sweden. The null hypothesis of no difference between 
these countries is again rejected: its probability of being true is less than 
5 percent (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 660–64). Female lifetime celi-
bacy, likewise, was higher in 11 other (slower-growing) European coun-
tries than it was in England and higher in 12 other countries than it was 
in the Netherlands (Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 664–66). Similar 
???????????? ???????? ??????? ????? ???? ????????? ??? ?????????? ???????????
(Dennison and Ogilvie 2014, pp. 666–69).
CPZM point out that our data set contains relatively few observa-
tions for Croatia, Belarus, the Baltic societies, Iceland, Malta, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. On the other hand, our anal-
ysis was based on 617 observations for Germany, 365 for England, 356 
for northern France, 266 for the Netherlands, 220 for Belgium, 170 for 
Bohemia, 82 for Austria, 61 for Switzerland, 137 for Sweden, and 244 
for the other four Scandinavian countries taken together. Obtaining more 
observations on the under-researched societies listed above would not 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
were characterized by moderate demographic patterns, whereas the slow-
growing economies in Scandinavia and German-speaking central Europe 
had more extreme manifestations of the EMP. Certainly more data are 
always desirable, and one aim of our work was to stimulate additional 
research in historical demography. Such studies are needed not only for 
the under-researched parts of Europe, but for other continents as well, 
especially given claims that the EMP also caused economic divergence 
between China and Europe (Voigtländer and Voth 2006; De Moor and 
van Zanden 2010). It is unlikely, however, that collecting more data will 
do anything but reinforce the conclusion that the most extreme mani-
festations of the EMP in early modern Europe were not associated with 
rapid economic growth while the most successful European economies 
manifested a moderate demographic pattern.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between institutions, demography, and economic deci-
sions can certainly cast light on long-term economic growth. However, 
it is important to recognize the problem of endogeneity and carefully 
analyze causal links. The arguments advanced in CPZM’s comment 
on our article cannot be sustained. Recent literature putting the EMP 
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at the heart of economic growth focuses primarily on England and the 
Netherlands. But these two countries did not have an extreme version 
of the EMP, although they were distinctive in other respects, notably in 
having more “generalized” institutions. The most extreme manifestations 
of the EMP prevailed in slow-growing economies such as those in central 
and nordic Europe, where “particularized” institutions predominated and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???????????????? ????????? ???????????????????????????? ???????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
work of nonfamilial institutions, not the EMP, that determined whether 
all economic agents (including women) could make a full contribution to 
the economy, whether markets worked well, and whether the economy 
grew successfully.
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